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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
BECKER, Chief Judge. 
 
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 
1988 (the WARN Act), 29 U.S.C. S 2101 et seq., mandates 
that employers provide workers with 60 days' notice 
(subject to certain exceptions not at issue in this appeal) 
prior to a plant closing or mass layoff, and allows various 
remedies for workers when closures ar e not preceded by 
the requisite notification. Because a plant closure often 
presages a corporation's demise, leaving workers with no 
source of satisfaction from their employer , plaintiffs have 
frequently sought damages from affiliated corporations. In 
a parallel series of cases, plaintiffs with claims arising from 
non-WARN Act sources of law against debt-laden or 
bankrupt corporations have occasionally attempted to sue 
the corporations' major secured lenders, on the theory that 
the lenders have exercised such control over the 
corporations that veil-piercing is appr opriate. This case 
implicates both lines of precedent. 
 
The question before us is whether the for mer employees 
of Component Technology (CompTech), a now-defunct 
company, have set forth sufficient evidence to cr eate a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether , under 
standards we must fashion for this Circuit, CompTech's 
major secured lender, General Electric Capital Corporation 
(GECC), should incur WARN Act liability for CompTech's 
unnoticed plant closure. This question, in tur n, requires us 
to consider not only the prerequisites for parent/subsidiary 
liability in the WARN Act context (as will be shown, that 
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jurisprudence is apposite here), but also whether the 
prerequisites change in the context of lender/borrower 
relationships. 
 
The Department of Labor (DOL) has issued a r egulation 
setting forth relevant factors for courts to use when 
considering whether to impose WARN Act liability on a 
parent corporation. See 20 C.F.R. S 639.3(a)(2). These 
factors closely resemble, but do not pr ecisely mirror, the 
"single employer" or "integrated enterprise" test, frequently 
utilized for similar purposes in labor and employment law. 
The Department has also issued a statement explaining its 
intention that jurisprudence under the WARN Act not 
deviate from "existing law" with r egard to liability for 
affiliated corporations. See 54 Fed. Reg. 16,045 (Apr. 20, 
1989). The tension between "existing law" and the 
regulatory factors has led to considerable confusion among 
courts as to the appropriate standards to apply for WARN 
Act veil-piercing. Compare United Paperworkers Int'l Union 
v. Alden Corrugated Container Corp., 901 F . Supp. 426, 
436-39 (D. Mass. 1995), with Wholesale & Retail Food 
Distrib. Local 63 v. Santa Fe Terminal Servs., Inc., 826 F. 
Supp. 326, 334-35 (C.D. Cal. 1993). To further compound 
the problem, when it comes to lenders rather than parents 
in other areas of law, courts have been extr emely reluctant 
to hold lenders liable for their borrowers' actions; usually, 
some version of the "alter ego" or "instrumentality" test for 
liability is used, often with an especial vigor . These tests are 
far less hospitable to plaintiffs than labor law's "integrated 
enterprise" test, and, apparently, than the Department of 
Labor factors. Thus, the law is presently unsettled as to the 
proper test for liability under the WARN Act, and as to the 
significance for WARN Act purposes of an affiliated 
corporation's status as "lender" or "par ent." 
 
In this case, GECC loaned large sums of money to 
CompTech, and CompTech fell into default. Exercising its 
rights under the loan agreements, GECC voted CompTech's 
stock and installed a new slate of directors and a new Chief 
Executive Officer, to whom title of the stock was 
transferred. For the next few years, GECC and CompTech 
maintained a close relationship as CompT ech struggled to 
survive as a going concern; when CompT ech finally was 
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unable to turn a profit, GECC declined to provide further 
cash infusions. CompTech, unable to secur e new financing, 
collapsed and shut down its operations without giving 
WARN Act notice. A class of former CompTech employees 
have now brought suit against GECC under the W ARN Act. 
 
We conclude that the appropriate test to employ under 
the WARN Act for affiliated corporate liability is the multi- 
factored test promulgated by the DOL. W e believe that the 
DOL's instruction that courts apply "existing law" to 
questions involving intercorporate liability was not intended 
to undermine the force of its own r egulation on the subject, 
but was instead intended to instruct courts that existing 
precedent applying other tests (such as the"integrated 
enterprise" test) may be useful and appropriate to resolve 
analogous questions arising under the WARN Act. We also 
observe that the regulation indicates that the listed factors 
are not an exhaustive list, which we interpr et as a reminder 
that the test is one of balancing, and that, as with any 
balancing test, a number of circumstances not specifically 
enumerated may be relevant. 
 
We must also determine whether GECC's initial status as 
a secured lender affects the test we choose to employ for 
WARN Act liability, and we must further decide whether, 
under the appropriate test, the District Court erred in 
concluding that plaintiffs had not put forth sufficient 
evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact as to 
GECC's liability. We ultimately hold that because the lines 
separating "parents" from "lenders" are not often bright 
ones, the simpler approach is to apply the same test for 
liability regardless of the formal label the corporations have 
attached to their association. Our conclusion is 
strengthened by our recognition that deter mining liability 
by reference to whether a lender has behaved in a "typical" 
manner, as did the District Court in this case, carries with 
it the risk of unintentionally altering what is"typical," as 
lenders structure their relationships with borrowers to 
respond to the practices that we ourselves have proclaimed 
"typical." Therefore, we take a mor e functional approach to 
determining whether or not to "pier ce the veil" under WARN 
by focusing on the nature and degree of control possessed 
by one corporation over another; in so doing, however, 
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particular weight must be accorded, wher e applicable, to a 
lack of ownership interest between corporations. 
 
Applying the DOL factors to the circumstances presented 
in this case, we hold that even if GECC did, in the course 
of its relationship with CompTech, technically become a 
"parent" corporation, its actions never r eached the point 
where even a more conventional par ent would become 
liable. Therefore, the District Court's grant of summary 
judgment to GECC was proper, and we will affirm the 
judgment. 
 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
 
Component Technology, a Delaware corporation with 
headquarters in Erie, Pennsylvania, was a custom injection 
molder whose business was to manufacture plastic objects 
in accordance with corporate customers' specifications, 
principally in the business machine and medical pr oducts 
markets. R&R Plastics (R&R) was, at that time, a wholly- 
owned subsidiary of CompTech. 
 
In June 1989, CompTech was poised to enter into a 
profitable new arrangement with Kodak, wher eby 
CompTech would manufacture plastic components for a 
revolutionary new photocopier. In anticipation of the capital 
expansion that the venture would requir e, CompTech 
sought and obtained a $25,000,000 loan from GECC. The 
loan was formally structured as a loan to the Chicago 
Plastics Products Corporation (Chicago Plastics), a holding 
company formed for the purpose of acquiring CompTech. 
As security for its loan, GECC received pledge agreements 
for all of the stock in Chicago Plastics, CompT ech, and 
R&R, including the right to vote the stock in the event of a 
default. 
 
Shortly after Chicago Plastics purchased CompT ech, the 
Kodak project was canceled due to "technical 
obsolescence." CompTech's business immediately faltered, 
resulting in default on the GECC loan in 1991. GECC 
exercised its rights under the pledge agr eements and voted 
its stock to install new boards of directors of the three 
corporations. The new directors, in tur n, chose new 
corporate officers. On July 10, 1991 GECC hir ed a 
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consultant with experience in the plastics industry, Thomas 
Gaffney, to serve as Chief Executive Officer of Chicago 
Plastics, CompTech, and R&R. 
 
At some point in late 1991 or early 1992, GECC V ice- 
President Jeanette Chen began to manage the CompTech 
account. In March, she drafted an inter nal credit 
memorandum outlining a proposed strategy to r estructure 
CompTech's loans. The memo explained that for GECC to 
"[m]aximize debt recovery" it would need to "hold[ ] 
investment for sufficient time period to implement 
merger/acquisition strategy, rebuild customer base, and 
return Company to profitability." Pursuant to the 
recommendations contained in the memo, GECC wr ote off 
$20,000,000 of CompTech's debt and restructured the 
remaining debt as term loans of $3,500,000, a revolving 
line of credit of $3,500,000, and nonvoting pr eferred stock 
of $4,000,000. 
 
GECC then renewed its agreement with Gaf fney and 
arranged for a private foreclosure sale of CompTech's stock 
from Chicago Plastics. The stock was sold to Component 
Technology Acquisition Company (Acquisition), a wholly- 
owned subsidiary of Component Technology Holdings 
Corporation (Holdings). Acquisition was then mer ged into 
CompTech. Sixty percent of the stock in Holdings was 
transferred to Gaffney; forty per cent was transferred to 
Richard Brooks, the newly-appointed pr esident of 
CompTech. GECC retained a pledge on all of the CompTech 
common stock, and neither Gaffney nor Br ooks paid any 
compensation for their stock. As part of the consulting 
agreement, GECC indemnified Gaffney for all liabilities 
(other than misconduct) arising out of his duties as CEO of 
the companies and as shareholder of Holdings. 
 
As a final step in the restructuring outlined in the Chen 
memo, CompTech acquired a plastics company known as 
Accuform and merged it with R&R. Thus, after these 
maneuvers, all of CompTech's stock was owned by a single 
holding company, Holdings, which, in turn, was owned by 
Gaffney and Brooks. Gaffney, the CEO of CompTech, was 
under contract to GECC to run the company, and had been 
indemnified by GECC for liabilities arising both out of his 
activities as CEO and his activities as a shar eholder. 
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The loan agreement, together with the $4,000,000 worth 
of nonvoting preferred stock held by GECC, provided GECC 
with a considerable amount of control over CompTech's 
finances. The loan agreement and GECC's stock ownership 
entitled GECC to receive certain scheduled payments and, 
in the event of two consecutive defaults or four defaults 
overall, to vote in new directors and assume control of 
CompTech until the deficiency was paid. No dividends 
could be paid on common stock until GECC had r eceived 
its preferred payments. Without prior authorization from 
GECC, CompTech was forbidden to engage in stock 
reorganization, lending or borrowing, mergers or 
acquisitions, large-scale capital expenditur es, or selling of 
assets encumbered by liens securing GECC loans. Further, 
GECC retained the right to approve any employee salaries 
in excess of $100,000 per year -- a restriction apparently 
intended to enable GECC to monitor the hiring of key 
personnel. Finally, GECC received warrants on 75% of 
CompTech's stock, 24% of which were to be gradually 
returned to CompTech as the loans were repaid, although 
there is no indication in the recor d of when, if ever, the 
remaining 51% were to be relinquished. As it turned out, 
CompTech was only able to pay a single dividend to GECC, 
in 1993, by using monies drawn from the r evolving line of 
credit. 
 
As CompTech continued to operate with the new loans in 
place, GECC exercised continuing oversight of its finances 
pursuant to the loan agreement, occasionally agreeing to 
waive penalties and extend further loans to the cash- 
strapped company. CompTech, in accordance with the 
agreement, sought approval of a number of its decisions, 
including executive compensation and benefits, and the 
sale of equipment. CompTech also provided GECC with 
updates concerning its financial condition. GECC's 
approval was required when CompT ech sought to create a 
Mexican subsidiary to service one of its customers, and in 
connection with the deal, GECC waived its security interest 
in relevant equipment, receiving in r eturn a pledge on all of 
the stock owned by CompTech in the new ventur e. 
 
In early 1994, CompTech sold R&R, and the pr oceeds of 
the sale were used to prepay GECC in accor dance with the 
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terms of the loan agreement. Later that year, Gaffney wrote 
to GECC outlining CompTech's current status and its 
proposed projects, seeking approval for those proposals 
relating to the Accuform acquisition. The letter concluded 
by saying "We need to know what G.E. wants us to do. We 
are proceeding with items 2, 3 and 4, but we need to get 
confirmation from G.E. on each one of these items. 
Obviously, without G.E.'s help we cannot proceed to 
complete our plans. I am prepared to do whatever G.E. 
wants relative to CompTech." 
 
The next month, GECC determined that as CEO of 
CompTech, Gaffney was too focused on"grandiose 
schemes" for the company and spent too little time on the 
day-to-day operations. According to the deposition of GECC 
Vice-President Ed Christie, it was for this reason GECC 
elected not to renew Gaffney's contract and asked him to 
step down as CEO. Gaffney had recentlyfired Brooks as 
president and replaced him with Charles V illa; GECC chose 
to hire Villa as the new president and CEO. In order to 
transfer power from Gaffney to Villa, both Gaffney and 
Brooks sold their stock back to Holdings for a nominal 
price, and Holdings reissued the stock to V illa. Villa then 
pledged the shares to GECC, and granted GECC the 
unconditional power to transfer and assign the stock. 
 
At some point after the plans for these transfers had 
been laid, but before the shift in ownership had actually 
taken place, Villa sent a letter to Chen detailing the current 
status of CompTech's attempts to resuscitate its business 
and requesting GECC's further support to finance its 
growth and upgrade its facilities. The letter concluded by 
stating that "G.E. needs to make decisions now on all the 
issues outlined in this memo. How you respond will then 
dictate what the management of COMPTECH will need to 
do to accomplish the task at hand. We can either move 
forward in an aggressive, systematic appr oach to take 
advantage of industry dynamics and market windows 
available now or we can remain stagnant and loose [sic] any 
competitive edge that may exist resulting in a slow death of 
a one-time INDUSTRY LEADER. The choice is yours to 
make." 
 
                                8 
  
When the stock transfers finally were completed in late 
June 1994, a number of new rights were granted to GECC. 
At any time within the first six months, GECC could force 
Villa to sell his shares to GECC for the same nominal 
amount that he had paid (the Villa Call). Further, at any 
time -- either before or after the first six months -- GECC 
could force Villa to sell a portion of the stock for value, 
either to GECC or to a GECC designee (the Bring-Along 
Call). The purpose of the Villa Call was to enable GECC to 
"assess Villa's abilities on a trial basis," and, should he 
prove to be unsatisfactory, easily transfer the shares to a 
new president. The stated purpose of the Bring-Along Call 
was to allow GECC to sell CompTech if it so chose. Villa, as 
the stockholder, had the right to vote the shares so long as 
CompTech stayed current with loan payments; however, it 
appears that CompTech was in default either at the time of 
the transfer or shortly thereafter, so that in fact, GECC at 
all times possessed the voting rights. GECC acknowledged 
in its internal memoranda that, as a r esult of these options, 
it was potentially responsible for the company's liabilities 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 
1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. S 1001 et seq. However , because by 
this time CompTech had frozen its benefits plans and could 
not create new ones without GECC approval, there was no 
risk that GECC would involuntarily become liable for 
payments under ERISA. 
 
Simultaneous with the stock transfer, GECC r equested 
that CompTech hire Stuart Benton as an industry 
consultant to "help assess the Company's ongoing cash 
needs and determine an appropriate account strategy for 
GECC going forward." Benton was also to function as a 
"backup" president should Villa fail to meet GECC 
expectations. Although Benton was formally under contract 
to CompTech, several CompTech employees testified in 
deposition that they understood him to be a GECC 
representative. 
 
Benton observed the CompTech operation for the next 
few months, until the plant closed. Deposition testimony 
from CompTech's upper-level managers demonstrates that 
although he occasionally made suggestions to the 
managers, Benton largely worked with V illa and did not 
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direct or interfere with the duties of the other management 
personnel. None of the upper-level managers, including 
Villa, reported any attempts by GECC to control 
CompTech's operations, through Benton or through anyone 
else. Other than the financial controls and stock interests 
described above, GECC had no formal authority to control 
CompTech's business decisions, including its strategic 
planning, its relationships with clients, its marketing, its 
product selection, its product design, or its quality control. 
 
By August 1994, CompTech was contemplating a plant 
closure, going so far as to contact its attor neys to inquire 
about its WARN Act obligations. In September 1994, 
CompTech informed GECC that it would r equire further 
cash outlays to continue operations through the end of the 
year. CompTech also sought financing from Citibank 
Venture Capital Limited, but Citibank would only provide 
financing if GECC continued to do so as well. GECC 
refused to provide further funds, either with or without 
Citibank's participation, and, on September 30, Chen 
drafted an internal memorandum sketching out a proposal 
for an "orderly liquidation" of the company. Negotiations for 
CompTech's liquidation began in October 1994, and on 
October 14, 1994, employees were formally notified of the 
plant closing, effective immediately. 
 
The former employees of CompTech filed this action 
against GECC in the District Court for the W estern District 
of Pennsylvania on November 2, 1994. On December 17, 
1999, after discovery, the District Court granted GECC's 
motion for summary judgment on the ground that the 
plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate that GECC, as a lender, 
had "exhibit[ed] such a high degree of control over the 
debtor corporation" so as to become an "employer" within 
the meaning of the WARN Act. Pearson v. Component Tech. 
Corp., 80 F. Supp.2d 510, 518 (W.D. Pa. 1999). The court 
also rejected the plaintiffs' attempts to argue for veil- 
piercing liability based on GECC's status as a parent 
corporation of CompTech, reasoning that GECC was not a 
parent and that its actions were "consistent with its role as 
CompTech's secured creditor." Id. at 523. 
 
On appeal, the plaintiffs argue that: (1) GECC was an 
employer within the meaning of the WARN Act as a matter 
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of law by virtue of its ownership of CompTech stock 
options; and (2) GECC was a parent corporation of 
CompTech under circumstances justifying veil-piercing 
under WARN Act standards. The District Court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. W e exercise 
plenary review over a District Court's grant of summary 
judgment. See Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. American 
States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d 144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993). We set 
forth the familiar summary judgment standard in the 
margin.1 
 
II. Liability for Affiliated Corporations Under 
the WARN Act 
 
A. Introduction 
 
In the wake of numerous plant closings and mer gers in 
the 1970s and 1980s, Congress passed the W ARN Act. See 
Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Int'l Union Local 54 v. 
Elsinore Shore Assocs., 173 F .3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 1999). 
The Act was intended to protect workers by r equiring that 
companies with advance knowledge of an imminent closing 
provide notice to employees, so as to allow"workers and 
their families some transition time to adjust to the 
prospective loss of employment, to seek and obtain 
alternative jobs and, if necessary, to enter skill training or 
retraining that will allow these workers to successfully 
compete in the job market." 20 C.F.R.S 639.1(a). Thus, the 
Act states that: 
 
       An employer shall not order a plant closing or mass 
       layoff until the end of a 60-day period after the 
       employer serves written notice of such an or der . . . to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Summary judgment is proper if ther e is no genuine issue of material 
fact and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non- 
moving party, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
322 
(1986). At the summary judgment stage, the judge's function is not to 
weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter, but to 
determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. See Anderson v. 
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). 
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       each representative of the affected employees as of the 
       time of the notice or, if there is no such representative 
       at that time, to each affected employee. . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. S 2102(a)(1). 
 
The Act defines an employer as "any business enterprise" 
that employs 100 or more employees. Id.S 2101(a). 
Employers violating the Act are liable for backpay and back 
benefits. See id. S 2104(a). Thus, the question presented by 
this litigation is whether, under these facts, GECC was the 
plaintiffs' employer. In order to make such a showing, the 
plaintiffs must establish GECC to be a single"business 
enterprise" with CompTech such that it is r esponsible for 
CompTech's WARN Act obligations. 
 
The question when affiliated corporations will be 
considered a single employer for WARN Act purposes tends 
to arise in two contexts: (1) when plaintiffs seek to impose 
liability for violations on affiliates of insolvent corporations, 
see, e.g., Local 397, Int'l Union of Electronic, Elec. Salaried 
Mach. & Furniture Workers v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 779 
F. Supp. 788 (D.N.J. 1992); and (2) when plaintiffs seek to 
establish that two or more affiliated corporations should be 
viewed as a single enterprise in order to meet the 100 
employee WARN Act threshold, see, e.g., Watts v. Marco 
Holdings, L.P., No. 3:95CV88-B-A, 1997 WL 578783 (N.D. 
Miss. Aug. 8, 1997). The WARN Act itself does not address 
such situations, but the Department of Labor r egulations 
issued under the Act provide that: 
 
       Under existing legal rules, independent contractors and 
       subsidiaries which are wholly or partially owned by a 
       parent company are treated as separate employers or 
       as a part of the parent or contracting company 
       depending upon the degree of their independence from 
       the parent. Some of the factors to be consider ed in 
       making this determination are (i) common ownership, 
       (ii) common directors and/or officers, (iii) de facto 
       exercise of control, (iv) unity of personnel policies 
       emanating from a common source, and (v) the 
       dependency of operations. 
 
20 C.F.R. S 639.3(a)(2). The five factors will hereinafter be 
referred to as the "DOL factors." 
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The Department of Labor's "supplementary infor mation" 
regarding its WARN Act regulations explains that: 
 
       The intent of the regulatory provision r elating to 
       independent contractors and subsidiaries is not to 
       create a special definition of these ter ms for WARN 
       purposes; the definition is intended only to summarize 
       existing law that has developed under State 
       Corporations laws and such statutes as the NLRA, the 
       Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and the Employee 
       Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). The 
       Department does not believe that there is any r eason to 
       attempt to create new law in this area especially for 
       WARN purposes when relevant concepts of State and 
       federal law adequately cover the issue. 
 
54 Fed. Reg. 16,045 (Apr. 20, 1989). 
 
The intersection of the regulatory factors and the 
supplementary information has created considerable 
confusion among courts searching for a single test to 
determine the status of affiliated corporations. See Cynthia 
Nance, Affiliated Corporation Liability Under the WARN Act, 
52 Rutgers L. Rev. 495, 535-36 (2000) [her einafter Nance, 
WARN Act] (describing contradictory holdings). The problem 
arises because the jurisprudence contains several tests for 
determining when two corporations compose a single entity 
depending on whether the cause of action accrues under 
state or federal law, as well as on the particular type of 
claim at issue. Further, the DOL factors do not precisely 
correspond to any of the established tests for such 
determinations. Courts examining affiliated corporations 
under the WARN Act have often applied two or more tests, 
purporting to "average" the results, usually without any 
systematic method for doing so. See, e.g., United 
Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Alden Corrugated Container 
Corp., 901 F. Supp. 426, 436-39 (D. Mass. 1995) 
(conducting, inter alia, a state alter ego test, but ultimately 
jettisoning the results on the ground that federal liability 
standards should not turn on state pr otections for 
corporations). 
 
A further complication comes from the fact that we have 
before us in this case not the traditional par ent/subsidiary 
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relationship but a relationship that began as an 
arrangement between a secured lender and a borr ower -- a 
situation unaddressed by either the Act or the regulations. 
Thus, we must determine whether the "standard" WARN 
Act test -- whatever test that might be -- is even applicable 
under these circumstances. To that end, we will first briefly 
sketch some of the methods available for deter mining 
intercorporate WARN Act liability, ultimately concluding 
that rather than simply choosing one of the "established" 
tests and importing it to the WARN Act context, the 
appropriate test is the one specifically delineated in the 
DOL regulation. We further conclude that the 
supplementary information provided by the Department of 
Labor was not intended to encourage courts to choose a 
different test, but was merely intended to clarify that courts 
may draw on concepts in existing precedent when 
interpreting and applying the DOL factors. W e will then 
turn to the question whether the DOL factors should apply 
to situations involving lenders rather than par ents, 
ultimately concluding that the factors should be the same 
for both. 
 
B. Liability Between Parents and Subsidiaries 
 
1. Traditional Veil-Pier cing Theories 
 
The corporate form was created to allow shareholders to 
invest without incurring personal liability for the acts of the 
corporation. These principles are equally applicable when 
the shareholder is, in fact, another corporation, and hence, 
mere ownership of a subsidiary does not justify the 
imposition of liability on the parent. See United States v. 
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 69 (1998); American Bell Inc. v. 
Federation of Tel. Workers of Pa., 736 F.2d 879, 887 (3d Cir. 
1984). Nor will liability be imposed on the par ent 
corporation merely because directors of the parent 
corporation also serve as directors of the subsidiary. See 
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 69. However, under both state and 
federal common law, abuse of the corporate for m will allow 
courts to employ the "tool of equity" known as veil-piercing, 
i.e., disregard of the corporate entity to impose liability on 
the corporation's shareholders. Publicker Indus., Inc. v. 
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Roman Ceramics Corp., 603 F.2d 1065, 1069 (3d Cir. 1979). 
Courts have held veil-piercing to be appr opriate "when the 
court must prevent fraud, illegality, or injustice, or when 
recognition of the corporate entity would defeat public 
policy or shield someone from liability for a crime," Zubik v. 
Zubik, 384 F.2d 267, 272 (3d Cir. 1967), or when "the 
parent so dominated the subsidiary that it had no separate 
existence," New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Pr ot. v. Ventron Corp., 
468 A.2d 150, 164 (N.J. 1983). 
 
The Third Circuit alter ego test is fairly typical of the genre.2 
It requires that the court look to the following factors: gross 
undercapitalization, failure to observe corporate formalities, 
nonpayment of dividends, insolvency of debtor corporation, 
siphoning of funds from the debtor corporation by the 
dominant stockholder, nonfunctioning of officers and 
directors, absence of corporate recor ds, and whether the 
corporation is merely a facade for the operations of the 
dominant stockholder. See American Bell , 736 F.2d at 886. 
Other (similar) formulations are set forth in the margin.3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Although the tests employed to determine when circumstances 
justifying "veil-piercing" exist are variously referred to as the "alter 
ego," 
"instrumentality," or "identity" doctrines, the formulations are generally 
similar, and courts rarely distinguish them. See Phillip I. Blumberg, The 
Law of Corporate Groups: Substantive Law S 6.01, at 111 (1987). The 
most important differences across jurisdictions seem to reside largely in 
two aspects of these different for mulations: first, whether an element of 
"fraudulent intent," inequitable conduct, or injustice is explicitly 
required, see id. S 6.02, at 115, and second, a general sense that federal 
courts are more likely to pierce the veil in order to effectuate federal 
policy, lest state corporate laws be permitted to frustrate federal 
objectives, see Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 365 (1944); United 
Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d 
1080, 1092 (1st Cir. 1992). 
3. For comparison, the Massachusetts version r equires consideration of 
common ownership, pervasive control, inter mingling of activity and 
assets, undercapitalization, lack of corporate formalities, absence of 
records, nonpayment of dividends, insolvency at the time of the relevant 
transaction, siphoning of corporate assets by shar eholders, 
nonfunctioning officers and directors, use of the corporation for the 
transactions of dominant shareholders, and use of the corporation for 
fraud. See Evans v. Multicon Constr. Corp., 574 N.E.2d 395, 398 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 1991). The Illinois version considers the failure to maintain 
records and formalities, commingling of funds, undercapitalization, and 
one corporation treating the assets of the other as its own. See Van Dorn 
Co. v. Future Chem. & Oil Corp., 753 F .2d 565, 570 (7th Cir. 1985). 
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The test, whether or not a particular version r equires an 
element of fraudulent intent, see supra note 2, is 
demonstrably an inquiry into whether the debtor 
corporation is little more than a legal fiction. Such a 
burden is notoriously difficult for plaintif fs to meet. For 
instance, courts have refused to pierce the veil even when 
subsidiary corporations use the trade name of the parent, 
accept administrative support from the par ent, and have a 
significant economic relationship with the parent. See, e.g., 
Jackson v. General Elec. Co., 514 P.2d 1170 (Alaska 1973). 
Thus, in order to succeed on an alter ego theory of liability, 
plaintiffs must essentially demonstrate that in all aspects of 
the business, the two corporations actually functioned as a 
single entity and should be treated as such. See RRX 
Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 545 (9th Cir. 
1985) (veil-piercing is appropriate when"the personalities of 
the corporation and individual are no longer separate"); 
Akzona Inc. v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 607 F. Supp. 
227, 237 (D. Del. 1984) (a subsidiary is an alter ego or 
instrumentality of the parent when "the separate corporate 
identities . . . are a fiction and . . . the subsidiary is, in fact, 
being operated as a department of the parent"). 
 
2. "Integrated Enterprise" Test  
 
Veil-piercing doctrine has been criticized for employing 
the same formulations of the test across the different 
contexts in which plaintiffs seek to impose liability. See 
Phillip I. Blumberg, The Law of Corporate Groups: 
Substantive Law S 6.01, at 107-08 (1987); cf. William H. 
Lawrence, Lender Control Liability: An Analytical Model 
Illustrated with Applications to the Relational Theory of 
Secured Financing, 62 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1387, 1388 (1989) 
[hereinafter Lawrence, Lender Contr ol Liability] (criticizing 
the use of similar "indicia of control" for lender liability 
cases regardless of context). It is often argued that because 
public policy varies from contract to tort to property, for 
example, veil-piercing standards should vary as well. See, 
e.g., Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An 
Empirical Study, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1036 (1991). These 
concerns have been partially addressed through the 
"integrated enterprise" test for the pr esence of a single 
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employer, a sort of labor-specific veil-piercing test, first 
developed by the National Labor Relations Boar d. 
 
Because the Board was concerned only with labor law 
and policy, it developed a test for corporate "sameness" 
that, likewise, concerned itself only with those aspects of 
corporations having a direct relevance to labor relations. 
So, for example, the integrated enterprise test is not 
concerned with such traditional alter ego hallmarks as 
"nonpayment of dividends," because such aspects of a 
corporation's finances are not as dir ectly related to 
management's labor policy as are other aspects of corporate 
functioning. See Nance, WARN Act , supra, at 533. Rather, 
the test looks to four labor-related characteristics of 
affiliated corporations: interrelation of operations; common 
management; centralized control of labor r elations; and 
common ownership or financial control. See, e.g., Radio & 
Television Broad. Techs. Local Union 1264 v. Broadcast 
Serv. of Mobile, 380 U.S. 255, 256 (1965) (per curiam). No 
single factor is dispositive; rather, single employer status 
under this test "ultimately depends on all the 
circumstances of the case." NLRB v. Br owning-Ferris Indus. 
of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir . 1982). 
 
As originally designed, the integrated enterprise test was 
used by the National Labor Relations Board to determine 
whether two firms were sufficiently r elated to meet its 
jurisdictional minimum amount of business volume. See 
Stephen F. Befort, Labor Law and the Double-Breasted 
Employer: A Critique of the Single Employer and Alter Ego 
Doctrines and a Proposed Reformulation , 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 
67, 75. Later, the Board came to use the same test to 
determine whether nominally separate fir ms constituted 
"neutral" entities in the context of secondary boycotts, and 
to determine whether an employer had imper missibly 
"double-breasted" operations so as to avoid the obligations 
of a collective bargaining agreement. See id. at 75-76.4 
 
Since its initial formulation, the test has been applied by 
courts in other employment contexts, including the Labor 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In a "double-breasted" operation, a company divides its business into 
union and nonunion shops. See Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l 
Ass'n, 949 F.2d 1241, 1245 (3d Cir . 1991). 
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Management Relations Act, see International Bhd. of 
Teamsters Local 952 v. American Delivery Serv. Co., Inc., 50 
F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 1995); Title VII and the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act, see Frank v. U.S. West, 
Inc., 3 F.3d 1357 (10th Cir. 1993); the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, see EEOC v. Chemtech Int'l Corp., 890 F. 
Supp. 623 (S.D. Tex. 1995); and the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, see Takacs v. Hahn Auto. Corp., No. C-3-95-404, 1999 
WL 33117265 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 1999). But see Papa v. 
Katy Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940-43 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(rejecting the integrated enterprise test in the context of 
antidiscrimination law). Department of Labor r egulations 
have also adopted the integrated enterprise test for the 
Family Medical Leave Act. See 29 C.F .R. 825.104(c)(2). 
 
The integrated enterprise test, with its focus only on 
labor relations and its emphasis on economic r ealities as 
opposed to corporate formalities, see Phillip I. Blumberg, 
The Law of Corporate Groups: Problems of Parent and 
Subsidiary Corporations Under Statutory Law of General 
Application S 13.03, at 398 (1989), is demonstrably easier 
on plaintiffs than traditional veil pier cing. Ultimately, "the 
policy underlying the single employer doctrine is the 
fairness of imposing liability for labor infractions where two 
nominally independent entities do not act under an arm's 
length relationship." Murray v. Miner , 74 F.3d 402, 405 (2d 
Cir. 1996). 
 
3. Direct Liability 
 
Although not often employed to hold parent corporations 
liable for the acts of subsidiaries in the absence of other 
hallmarks of overall integration of the two operations, it has 
long been acknowledged that parents may be"directly" 
liable for their subsidiaries' actions when the"alleged wrong 
can seemingly be traced to the parent thr ough the conduit 
of its own personnel and management," and the par ent has 
interfered with the subsidiary's operations in a way that 
surpasses the control exercised by a par ent as an incident 
of ownership. United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 64 
(1998) (quoting William O. Douglas & Carr ol M. Shanks, 
Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 
39 Yale L.J. 193, 207 (1929)). In such situations, the parent 
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has not acted on its own (in which case ther e would be no 
need even to consider the subsidiary's actions), nor has it 
acted in its capacity as owner of the subsidiary; rather, it 
has forced the subsidiary to take the complained-of action, 
in disregard of the subsidiary's distinct legal personality. 
See Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 756-57 (7th Cir. 
1989). Thus, in the labor context, "direct" liability may 
attach if the parent has overridden the subsidiary's 
ordinary decision-making process and or dered it to 
institute an unfair labor practice, or to cr eate 
discriminatory hiring policies. See id. at 757. In this way, 
direct liability functions essentially as a kind of 
"transaction-specific" alter ego theory. Id. at 756. 
 
Although direct liability is rarely used independently to 
hold parents liable for their subsidiary's actions, it has 
often been used in conjunction with the "integrated 
enterprise" test for liability, particularly to satisfy the 
"control of labor" prong. For instance, the Ninth Circuit in 
UA Local 343 of the United Ass'n of Jour neymen & 
Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the 
United States & Canada v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F.3d 
1465 (9th Cir. 1995), held that the "contr ol of labor" prong 
of the integrated enterprise test may be established either 
by a showing of day-to-day control of labor , or by a showing 
that the parent was specifically responsible for the labor 
practice at issue in the litigation. See id. at 1471. Other 
courts have explained that all four factors of the integrated 
enterprise test are to be employed solely with an eye to 
discerning which entity -- the parent or the subsidiary -- 
was the final decisionmaker for the challenged practice. 
See, e.g., Hukill v. Auto Care, Inc. , 192 F.3d 437, 444 (4th 
Cir. 1999); Lusk v. Foxmeyer Health Corp. , 129 F.3d 773, 
777 (5th Cir. 1997). Thus, the "dir ectness" of a parent's 
involvement in the employment decision under dispute may 
be conceived as a sliding scale; if the parent has sufficiently 
overwhelmed its subsidiary in taking the challenged action, 
such a showing is sufficient to create liability; if the parent 
was involved to a lesser degree, there must be some 
demonstration of the presence of the other aspects of the 
integrated enterprise test. 
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4. Choosing a Test for WARN Liability 
 
Given these variations in the methods by which courts 
determine when corporations shall be liable for the acts of 
their affiliates, it is not surprising that ther e has been a 
good deal of inconsistency among the courts attempting to 
apply "existing law" in the context of the W ARN Act.5 In the 
first reported case on the subject, Local 397, International 
Union of Electronic, Electrical Salaried Machine & Furniture 
Workers v. Midwest Fasteners, Inc., 779 F . Supp. 788 
(D.N.J. 1992), the court employed three dif ferent tests -- 
Third Circuit federal veil-piercing, the integrated enterprise 
test, and the DOL factors -- to determine whether parent 
and grandparent corporations could be held liable for the 
debts of a subsidiary. The court concluded that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In addition to the tests for liability listed above, there are numerous 
others that are employed less frequently, or only in specific contexts. 
Sometimes courts will impose liability on a par ent for a subsidiary's 
acts 
based on a theory of "agency," i.e., that the subsidiary organization, 
although (unlike an alter ego) possessed of a distinct legal personality 
from the parent, has acted as the par ent's agent in a series of 
transactions and therefore has the power to bind the parent. See, e.g., 
A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc. v. International Union, United Mine Workers of 
Am., 799 F.2d 142, 147 (4th Cir. 1986); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Roman 
Ceramics Corp., 603 F.2d 1065, 1070 (3d Cir. 1979); A. Gay Jenson 
Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 309 N.W .2d 285 (Minn. 1981). 
 
Moreover, specific statutes have their own tests. For instance, the 
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980, 29 U.S.C. S 1381 
et seq., treats as a single employer all businesses "under common 
control," borrowing its definition of"common control" from the Internal 
Revenue Code. That definition, in turn, looks purely to stock ownership 
to define a "controlled group," and ownership in this context includes 
stock options. See IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Barker & Williamson, 
Inc., 788 F.2d 118, 123 (3d Cir. 1986). Cases construing the 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. S 9601 et seq., have also set forth standards for 
determining when parent corporations will be responsible for the waste 
management responsibilities of subsidiaries. See United States v. 
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51 (1998). And cases under the Securities Act of 
1933, 15 U.S.C. S 77a et seq., and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
15 U.S.C. S 78a et seq., have fashioned distinct standards of liability 
for 
entities that "control" businesses found to be in violation of the 
securities laws. See Lawrence, Lender Control Liability, supra, at 1393. 
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corporations were separate under an "alter ego" analysis, 
but identical under integrated enterprise analysis and the 
DOL factors. In reconciling these differ ent outcomes, the 
court ultimately explained that the WARN Act was enacted 
to protect workers, and that the "wr ongdoer" should not 
escape liability merely because "corporate formalities" were 
observed -- a principle that the court noted had been 
established in federal labor statutes generally. Id. at 800. 
Thus, the court held that the outcomes of the integrated 
enterprise and DOL factors would control the analysis, 
rendering its entire discussion of alter ego not only 
superfluous, but also inapposite. 
 
Other courts have followed the multi-part Midwest 
Fasteners approach, although the application of its 
principles varies widely. For instance, in W atts v. Marco 
Holdings, L.P., No. 3:95CV88-B-A, 1997 WL 578783 (N.D. 
Miss. Aug. 8, 1997), the court chose to apply state, rather 
than federal, veil-piercing analysis, all the while 
acknowledging that, as Midwest Fasteners had stated, for 
the purpose of determining whether two nominally separate 
companies constituted a single employer, state law veil- 
piercing was probably inappropriate. See id. at *2; see also 
United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Alden Corrugated 
Container Corp., 901 F. Supp. 426, 436-39 (D. Mass. 1995) 
(applying state corporate law, integrated enterprise, and the 
DOL factors and concluding that because WARN is a federal 
labor statute, the outcomes of the federal tests, rather than 
the state alter ego test, should control). 
 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the court in 
Wholesale & Retail Food Distribution Local 63 v. Santa Fe 
Terminal Services, 826 F. Supp. 326 (C.D. Cal. 1993), also 
applying state alter ego principles, rejected the plaintiffs' 
assertions that state veil-piercing was less important under 
WARN than the DOL factors, and chose not to employ the 
integrated enterprise test at all. See id. at 334-35. In United 
Mine Workers of America, District 2 v. Flor ence Mining Co., 
855 F. Supp. 1466 (W.D. Pa. 1994), the court, although 
purporting to follow Midwest Fasteners, actually appeared 
to apply only the DOL factors in concluding that two 
corporations did not constitute a single employer for WARN 
Act purposes. See id. at 1480. Finally, in International 
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Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 952 v. American Delivery 
Service, 50 F.3d 770 (9th Cir. 1995), the Ninth Circuit 
expressed doubts about the need to apply several different 
tests for liability, yet still chose to apply both the integrated 
enterprise test and the DOL factors, albeit concurr ently due 
to the tests' similarity. See id. at 776. 6 
 
The current trend toward applying mor e than one test for 
affiliated corporate liability is manifestly unworkable. Not 
only does this approach generate considerable uncertainty 
for parties affected by the WARN Act (the briefs presented 
to us are exemplars; they spend an inor dinate amount of 
time simply running through differ ent possible tests for 
liability), but it also obfuscates the purposes of the inquiry 
itself, i.e., whether the affiliated corporation should be 
legally responsible for issuing WARN notice. Further, 
although the importation of state law standar ds into federal 
law is permissible when state law is deemed to effectuate 
federal policy, see Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln 
Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957), state veil-piercing 
standards hardly seem likely to do so when such standards 
may generate inconsistency in an area of law that has 
always been characterized by insistence on unifor mity. Cf. 
Antol v. Esposto, 100 F.3d 1111, 1115 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(discussing the need for uniformity in the interpretation of 
collective bargaining agreements). The use of state law 
standards also has the potential to per mit "[t]he policy 
underlying a federal statute" to be "defeated by . . . an 
assertion of state power." Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 
365 (1944). Finally, the multi-test approach is both "unduly 
complicated," American Delivery Serv., 50 F.3d at 776, and 
ultimately yields no definitive answer to the question of 
liability: When liability is uncertain enough to r esult in 
different outcomes for each of the dif ferent tests, there is no 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Just recently, in Hollowell v. Orleans Regional Hospital LLC, 217 F.3d 
379 (5th Cir. 2000), the Fifth Circuit upheld a jury finding that several 
corporations constituted a single employer for W ARN Act purposes where 
the jury had been instructed to follow only the DOL factors. However, it 
is unclear whether the court ultimately held that the DOL factors, and 
only those factors, were the appropriate method of analysis, for it 
refused 
to consider the defendants' arguments that the wrong legal standard had 
been applied. See id. at 389. 
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method of reconciling the results, much in the same way 
that a man with one watch always knows what time it is, 
but a man with two watches is never sure. Cf. Papa v. Katy 
Indus., Inc., 166 F.3d 937, 940 (7th Cir . 1999) (criticizing 
the integrated enterprise test on the ground that there is no 
way to reconcile the results of the pr ongs). 
 
Given these variations in the methods by which courts 
determine when corporations shall be liable for the acts of 
their affiliates, we decline to interpret the Department of 
Labor's statement that it does not intend to cr eate "new" 
law for WARN Act liability as a direction to courts to employ 
multiple tests within a single case. Rather, we conclude 
that the most prudent course is to employ the factors listed 
in the Department of Labor regulations themselves. This 
approach not only has the virtue of simplicity (if anything 
in this area of law can be described as "simple"), but also 
allows for the creation of a uniform standard of liability for 
the enforcement of a federal statute. Cf. United States v. 
Pisani, 646 F.2d 83, 87-88 (3d Cir . 1981) (holding that 
federal veil-piercing standards ar e appropriate in Medicare 
disputes due to the need for a uniform federal approach). 
Finally, and most importantly, the DOL factors ar e the best 
method for determining WARN Act liability because they 
were created with WARN Act policies in mind and, unlike 
traditional veil-piercing and some of the other theories, 
focus particularly on circumstances relevant to labor 
relations. 
 
The DOL factors are quite similar to the integrated 
enterprise test, which is understandable because the 
integrated enterprise test was also specifically intended to 
deal with labor relations. However, in addition to those 
factors that are analogous to the integrated enterprise 
factors, the Department of Labor's version has included a 
fifth, catch-all factor -- that of "de facto exercise of control" 
-- that has the potential to tip the balance in an otherwise 
close case. This factor is arguably pr oblematic, because 
read in isolation, it might well encourage the imposition of 
liability merely as a result of the contr ol ordinarily 
exercised by a parent corporation over a subsidiary by 
virtue of its ownership. Such a result would cause a type of 
liability that is not only at odds with the purpose of limited 
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liability in general, but also would be inconsistent with the 
"existing legal rules" regarding par ental liability that the 
Department of Labor would have courts apply. See 
Bestfoods, 524 U.S. at 61-62 (describing as"hornbook" law 
that a parent's exercise of control through ownership of 
stock is not grounds for holding the par ent liable for the 
subsidiary's actions). 
 
In reconciling this apparent tension, we observe that the 
DOL factors are, by their wording, mor e focused than their 
integrated enterprise test counterparts. For instance, rather 
than looking to "centralized control of labor relations" -- 
the factor that, in the integrated enterprise context, could 
be satisfied either upon a showing that the par ent and 
subsidiary functioned as a single entity, or , alternatively, 
upon a showing that the parent directed the subsidiary to 
institute the policy at issue -- the DOL for mulation is 
"unity of personnel policies," a rendering that appears to be 
more targeted toward discerning whether the nominally 
separate corporations actually functioned as a single entity 
with respect to such policies on a regular , day-to-day basis. 
Similarly, the "common management" prong of the 
integrated enterprise test, which allowed courts to focus not 
only on employees holding formal officer positions or 
directorships but also on employees occupying supervisory 
positions, see, e.g., Hukill v. Auto Car e, Inc., 192 F.3d 437, 
443 (4th Cir. 1999); Penntech Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 706 
F.2d 18, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1983), has been changed to 
"common officers and/or directors," a facially more specific 
requirement. 
 
In light of these changes, and in light of the instruction 
that the test should draw upon existing legal rules, we read 
the "de facto exercise of control" factor as an endorsement 
of the sort of hybrid direct liability analysis heretofore 
employed in the context of the integrated enterprise test -- 
allowing consideration not only of whether the two 
corporations shared the same labor policies, as the DOL's 
"unity" factor would suggest, but also of whether the parent 
company directly exercised control over the particular 
policy at issue. We further conclude that the regulation's 
specific instruction that the "factors" ar e a nonexhaustive 
list is meant only as a reminder that the inquiry is a 
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balancing test, and that, as with most balancing tests, a 
number of circumstances may be relevant. Just as the 
integrated enterprise test is often described as ultimately 
an inquiry into whether the two companies operated at 
arm's length, see NLRB v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., 
Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir . 1982), we believe that 
the Department of Labor's instructions are intended to 
allow the consideration of evidence that might otherwise fall 
outside of the listed factors in order to conduct such an 
inquiry. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In the long history of the corporate form and limited 
liability, both the common law and various pieces of 
legislation have developed numerous methods for 
determining when affiliated corporations should be treated 
as unified or as distinct entities. These methods are often 
quite different from each other , and vary across contexts. In 
light of this history, if we were to interpr et the DOL's 
instruction that courts apply "existing law" to determine 
WARN Act liability for affiliated corporations as a literal 
direction to employ the various tests that have been 
developed over the years, we would find ourselves ensnared 
in a web of complicated -- and conflicting -- lines of 
jurisprudence. We cannot believe that the Department 
intended such a result. 
 
Rather, in our view, the Department intended for courts 
to test for affiliated corporate liability under W ARN along 
the dimensions specifically enumerated in its r egulation. 
These dimensions, in turn, were adapted from other tests 
developed for intercorporate liability, most notably labor 
law's "integrated enterprise" test. In light of the similar 
considerations inherent in the DOL factors and in other 
such "veil-piercing" tests, we believe that the DOL's 
instruction that courts apply "existing law" is intended only 
to encourage courts to make use of established pr ecedent 
in interpreting and applying its factors. Further, via its 
statement that the factors are meant as a nonexhaustive 
list, the DOL has made room for the exer cise of the 
flexibility that this area of law requir es. Accordingly, in 
determining whether two or more corporations constitute a 
 
                                25 
  
single "employer," the factfinder may consider not only the 
aspects of corporate organization specifically listed in the 
regulation, but also may consider the other indicia of 
corporate "sameness" that have characterized this area of 
the law, such as nonfunctioning of officers and directors, 
gross undercapitalization, and other cir cumstances that 
demonstrate a lack of an arm's-length r elationship between 
the companies. 
 
We also interpret the DOL's inclusion of the "de facto 
exercise of control" factor to be an endorsement of the 
hybrid direct liability analysis heretofor e employed in the 
context of the integrated enterprise test. Thus, the"de facto 
exercise of control" prong allows the factfinder to consider 
whether the parent has specifically dir ected the allegedly 
illegal employment practice that forms the basis for the 
litigation. 
 
C. Lender Liability Under the WARN Act  
 
1. Discussion 
 
The preceding discussion focused on the standar ds to be 
employed for parent/subsidiary liability (or between sister 
corporations). But at the time their venture began, GECC 
was a major secured lender of CompTech, and not a parent. 
Neither the WARN Act itself, nor the r egulations, explicitly 
discuss the statute's applicability to lenders, but we agree 
with both the Eighth and the Ninth Circuits that, under 
some circumstances, a lender can become so entangled 
with its borrower's affairs so as to engender WARN Act 
liability. See Adams v. Erwin Weller Co. , 87 F.3d 269, 271 
(8th Cir. 1996); Chauffeurs, Sales Drivers, Warehousemen & 
Helpers Union Local 572 v. Weslock Corp., 66 F.3d 241, 244 
(9th Cir. 1995). Thus, the question becomes what 
circumstances must exist before such liability can attach. 
 
Courts have grappled with the question of lender liability 
in a wide variety of situations, such that the catch-phrase 
"lender liability" has now taken on a br oad meaning to refer 
to any kind of liability that can grow out of the 
lender/borrower relationship. See, e.g., Lawrence, Lender 
Control Liability, supra (describing various theories under 
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which lenders can be held liable either to their borrowers or 
to third parties). For our purposes, the most r elevant lines 
of precedent are those where thir d parties seek to impose 
liability on major lenders on the theory that the lenders 
have so controlled the borrowing corporation that the 
corporation was functionally being run by the lenders, or 
solely for the lenders' benefit, to the detriment of other 
creditors. See, e.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. National 
Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1973). 
Often, these claims arise in the context of a bankruptcy 
proceeding, whereby the creditors or the trustee seek 
equitable subordination of the major lender's claims. See, 
e.g., In re W.T. GrantCo., 699 F.2d 599 (2d Cir. 1983). In 
other situations, creditors simply sue the major lender on 
the theory that the lender's control over the borrower 
rendered the lender the real party in interest for the 
incurred debt. See, e.g., Combustion Sys. Servs., Inc. v. 
Schuylkill Energy Res., Inc., Civ.A. 92-4228, 1993 WL 
514496 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 1993). 
 
In these situations, the test usually applied is some 
version of traditional veil-piercing, be it alter ego, 
instrumentality, or some other formulation. See, e.g., In re 
Clark Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 693, 699 (5th Cir. 
1990) (explaining that, in the absence of fraud, a lender 
must have used its debtor as an instrumentality to justify 
equitable subordination); Great W est Cas. Co. v. Travelers 
Indem. Co., 925 F. Supp. 1455, 1462-63 (D.S.D. 1996) 
(utilizing state veil-piercing standards to determine whether 
a lender would be liable to a third party for the debtor's 
debts). This is precisely the test that was employed by the 
District Court when it concluded that because GECC was a 
lender and not a parent, the integrated enterprise test was 
inapplicable. See Pearson v. Component T ech. Corp., 80 F. 
Supp. 2d 510, 520 (W.D. Pa. 1999). We believe, however, 
that traditional lender/borrower veil-pier cing jurisprudence 
is inappropriate in the WARN Act context for many of the 
same reasons that we rejected such jurisprudence in the 
context of parent/subsidiary liability. 
 
To begin with, the precedent on this point does not draw 
as sharp a distinction between "lenders" and"parents" as 
the District Court perceived. Although Krivo and its progeny 
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employed strict veil piercing standards to suits against 
lenders, they did so in situations where even parents would 
have been examined under such standards. The only 
differences between parents and lenders came in the test's 
application, both via the court's awareness of the changed 
context, see Krivo, 483 F.2d at 1110 (observing that the 
lender's "control" was limited to itsfinancial interest as a 
major creditor), and the court's statement that the lack of 
stock ownership is "a factor to be consider ed in assessing 
the relationship between two companies," see id. at 1109; 
see also Riquelme Valdes v. Leisure Res. Group, Inc., 810 
F.2d 1345, 1353 (5th Cir. 1987) (explaining that complete 
ownership is a "symptom but not the sine qua non of alter 
ego status"). It follows that when the appr opriate test for 
parental liability is something other than the strict alter ego 
test, there should be a parallel change in the test for 
liability for lenders. 
 
Further, traditional veil-piercing jurisprudence tends to 
sweep quite broadly, allowing liability to attach only when 
there is complete unity of identity in all aspects of corporate 
functioning. See, e.g., Krivo, 483 F .2d at 1105 (liability 
attaches to lenders only when there has been"total control" 
over the debtor). Although such an inquiry may be 
appropriate for many types of claims, the mer e existence of 
the integrated enterprise test demonstrates that in the 
labor context, a more targeted inquiry is appropriate. We 
acknowledge that the DOL factors are explicitly made 
applicable in the WARN Act regulation only to "subsidiaries" 
and not to borrowers, but do not read that reference as 
precluding the application of the factors to lenders; rather, 
we believe that by directing courts to examine these 
particular factors, the Department of Labor was 
highlighting those aspects of corporate functioning that are 
most closely tied to the particular problems the WARN Act 
was intended to address.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. In its own decision granting summary judgment to GECC, the District 
Court relied on cases involving standar ds for equitable subordination in 
the bankruptcy law context, such as In re W.T. Grant, 699 F.2d 599 (2d 
Cir. 1983), and standards regar ding allegations that lenders have 
breached fiduciary obligations to borrowers, such as in Temp-Way Corp. 
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Additionally, the problem with creating such a sharp 
distinction in liability rules under the WARN Act for lenders 
and for parents is that it will not always be clear when a 
party should be characterized as a "lender ," when a party 
should be characterized as a parent or owner , and when a 
party occupies both roles. In the case befor e us, GECC 
began its relationship with CompTech as a lender, but 
subsequently foreclosed on the stock and, rather than 
merely holding the stock for only a few days before the 
plant closure (as was the case in W eslock), transferred it 
(for no consideration) to CompTech's Chief Executive Officer 
(then under contract to GECC), yet retained a considerable 
amount of control over the stock for the next several years 
as part of its plan to "hold" CompTech until the company 
could be restored to profitability. Given the ease with which 
Thomas Gaffney parted with the stock upon being asked by 
GECC to relinquish his position with CompT ech, it is 
certainly not clear that GECC should not be viewed as 
having owned CompTech's stock from the date of 
foreclosure until the date that the company was finally 
liquidated. 
 
Lenders may also occasionally be difficult to distinguish 
from parents because, although generally the difference 
between a "parent" and a "lender" is the existence of an 
equity, rather than a debt, interest in the company, lenders 
often structure their interests in hybrid ways. In this case, 
in addition to traditional loans, GECC chose to structure 
part of the debt by having CompTech modify its articles of 
incorporation so as to create a class of mandatorily 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
v. Continental Bank, 139 B.R. 299 (E.D. Pa. 1992). See Pearson, 80 F. 
Supp. 2d at 521. We do not believe that these precedents are particularly 
instructive. Both sorts of claims set a high bar for plaintiffs because 
the 
causes of action rely upon an allegation of wr ongdoing by the lender. 
WARN Act liability, by contrast, requir es no showing of fraud or even a 
culpable mental state, although a court may, in its discretion, reduce 
penalties if the employer proves good faith. See 29 U.S.C. 
S 2104(a)(1)(B)(4). Therefore, the standards justifying equitable 
subordination cannot be freely transferred. Cf. Lawrence, Lender Control 
Liability, supra, at 1388 (criticizing courts' tendencies to apply similar 
definitions of "control" for lender liability, no matter what the cause of 
action). 
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redeemable preferred stock tailor ed to GECC's interest. 
Such redeemable preferred stock is currently listed as 
neither equity nor liability according to U.S. generally 
accepted accounting principles. See Inter national 
Accounting Standards, SEC Release Nos. 33-7801 & 34- 
42430, 65 Fed. Reg. 8,896, 8,911 (Feb. 23, 2000). However, 
it is sometimes classified as equity in SEC opinions, see, 
e.g., The Southern Company, SEC Release Nos. 35-27323 & 
70-8277, 2000 SEC LEXIS 2860 (Dec. 27, 2000), although 
international accounting standards list such stock as a 
liability, see International Accounting Standards, supra, and 
federal regulations forbid such stock fr om being listed as 
stockholders' equity, see 17 C.F.R.S 210.5-02. See 
generally Anthony P. Polito, Useful Fictions: Debt and Equity 
Classification in Corporate Tax Law, 30 Ariz. St. L.J. 761 
(1998) (explaining the fluidity of the concepts of"debt" and 
"equity"). 
 
Several federal statutes have defined the ter m "parent" in 
such a way as to include GECC's interest. For instance, the 
Internal Revenue Code at 26 U.S.C. S 1563 defines as 
"parents" in a controlled gr oup those companies that own 
eighty percent of the of the stock of other corporations in 
the group, and 26 U.S.C. S 1202 r equires only fifty percent 
ownership. Ownership, in turn, is defined throughout the 
Code to include stock options. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. SS 318, 
544, 554, 1563. Under these definitions, GECC was a 
parent of CompTech after the transfer to Charles Villa, 
because GECC retained options on all of CompT ech's stock. 
The Code of Federal Regulations also contains definitions of 
"parent" and "subsidiary" that would include GECC's 
relationship to CompTech as a result of its power to vote 
the stock in the wake of CompTech's default. See 17 C.F.R. 
S 210.1-02. And Pennsylvania law defines the term 
"subsidiaries" for registered corporations as including those 
corporations for which another corporation has obtained 
options on fifty percent of the voting stock, see 15 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. S 2542, a definition that would also apply to 
GECC due to its calls obtained during the stock transfer to 
Villa. That the Supreme Court of Delawar e described the 
right to vote a majority of the board in the event of default 
as a "creditor's remedy" in In r e Bicoastal Corp., 600 A.2d 
343, 350 (Del. 1991), merely serves to highlight the hybrid 
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nature of such rights. Obviously, however , the regulatory 
purposes of these statutes (and the WARN Act itself) vary 
considerably. 
 
Finally, we note that the commonly understood dif ference 
between a "parent" and a "lender"-- i.e., the existence of 
an equity interest -- is largely accounted for in the DOL 
factors themselves, via the "common ownership" prong. 
Although this factor is typically referr ed to as the "least 
important" of the factors, International Bhd. of Teamsters 
Local 952 v. American Delivery Serv., 50 F .3d 770, 775 (9th 
Cir. 1995), these statements mean only that, by itself, 
ownership -- and even ownership coupled with common 
management -- is not a sufficient basis for liability, see 
Lusk v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 129 F.3d 773, 778 (5th Cir. 
1997). Although "financial control" will suffice to satisfy the 
"common ownership" prong of the integrated enterprise 
test, see, e.g., Frank v. U.S. W est, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1362 
(10th Cir. 1993), and it is likely that the DOL factors should 
be interpreted similarly, there is nothing to prevent courts 
from requiring a higher showing of contr ol in the absence 
of true ownership, just as they have done in traditional veil- 
piercing lender cases. See, e.g., Riquelme Valdes, 810 F.2d 
at 1354. 
 
2. Conclusion 
 
All things considered, including the absence of a 
satisfactory alternative, we are satisfied that the DOL 
factors are an appropriate method of deter mining lender 
liability as well as parental liability, and therefore hold that, 
regardless of whether GECC took on the status of "parent" 
in addition to its status of "lender" when it foreclosed on 
the stock, its involvement with CompTech will be tested by 
reference to those factors. We emphasize, however, that just 
as Krivo and similar cases took special note of the unique 
relationship between a lender and a borr ower, so should 
courts do the same when utilizing the DOL factors. Thus, 
courts should place special weight on a lender's lack of 
stock ownership, and the mere fact that a lender has 
loaned money to the borrower -- thus making the borrower, 
in some sense, financially beholden to the lender-- will not 
establish liability, or even "dependency of operations" as 
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that phrase is used in the DOL test, just as a par ent's 
ownership of stock will not suffice to create liability for the 
parent. 
 
Our application of the DOL factors will not, however , be 
dominated by an assessment of whether the defendant's 
behavior was "typical" of a secured lender, as other courts 
(including the District Court in this case) have done. See 
Pearson, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 525; see also Adams, 87 F.3d 
at 272 (refusing to hold a lender liable for W ARN Act 
violations because the lender's control was not"unusual for 
a lender loaning over eighteen million dollars"); Weslock, 66 
F.3d at 245 (refusing to hold lender liable because the 
control exercised was "consistent with the type of control a 
secured creditor legitimately may exer cise over a defaulting 
debtor" (quotations omitted)). "Typical" lender behavior is a 
mutable concept, and it will respond to the liability rules 
we put into place. See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory 
of Secured Financing, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 901, 934 (1986) 
(explaining that, if not for the liability rules currently in 
place, creditors would exercise mor e control over debtors 
than is now customary). Further, even total control of a 
delinquent borrower's business might well be justified as an 
effort to protect collateral. See id.  Thus, although courts 
should attend to the customary relationship between lender 
and borrower (just as they have attended to customary 
relationships between parents and subsidiaries in 
determining liability), they should also make a functional 
assessment of the amount of control involved. 
 
D. Summary 
 
Affiliated corporate liability under the W ARN Act is 
ultimately an inquiry into whether the two nominally 
separate entities operated at arm's length. Cf. NLRB v. 
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d 
Cir. 1982). To that end, the Department of Labor has 
specifically mandated consideration of: (1) common 
ownership, (2) common directors and/or officers, (3) de 
facto exercise of control, (4) unity of personnel policies 
emanating from a common source, and (5) the dependency 
of operations. We acknowledge that although these factors 
do not correspond precisely to established tests for liability, 
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reliance on analogous precedent may often be useful in the 
interpretation and application of those factors. 
 
We believe that the DOL's caveat that the factors are a 
nonexhaustive list is intended to allow the factfinder to 
consider other evidence, if any, of a functional integration 
between the two nominally separate entities -- with, as 
always, an eye to the sorts of circumstances that courts 
have considered relevant to "veil-pier cing" inquiries in the 
past. So, although ordinarily such hallmarks of integration 
as "nonfunctioning of officers and directors" and 
"nonpayment of dividends" are not of gr eat importance in 
the labor context, certainly the factfinder would be 
permitted to take such arrangements into account when 
determining WARN Act liability, as well as any other 
arrangements that bear on the question whether the two 
companies failed to maintain an arm's-length r elationship. 
 
Further, the "de facto exercise of control" factor allows 
the factfinder to consider, as has been done in the 
"integrated enterprise" context, whether a par ent 
corporation was the final decisionmaker for the challenged 
practice. If the evidence of the parent's contr ol with respect 
to the practice is particularly egregious -- for instance, if 
the parent corporation has "disregar d[ed] the separate legal 
personality of its subsidiary" in directing the subsidiary to 
act, Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739, 757 (7th Cir. 
1989) -- such evidence alone might be strong enough to 
warrant liability. 
 
Finally, we conclude that these factors, with their labor- 
specific focus, are more appropriate than traditional veil- 
piercing jurisprudence for gauging WARN Act liability with 
respect to lenders. As has always been the case, when a 
plaintiff seeks to hold one corporation liable for the debts of 
another, particular attention must be paid to any lack of an 
ownership interest between the two corporations, and such 
a lack must be weighed heavily against a finding of liability 
for the affiliated corporation. Further, just as a parent will 
not be held liable solely because of its ownership of the 
subsidiary, so too a lender will not be liable solely because 
of the financial dependence that necessitated the loan in 
the first place. 
 
                                33 
  
However, notwithstanding the importance of a lack of 
ownership interest between two corporations, we believe 
that in the application of the DOL factors, the ultimate 
inquiry should not depend entirely on an assessment of 
whether the lender has behaved in a "typical" fashion. 
"Typical" lender behavior is a mutable concept, and it will 
respond to the liability rules we put into place. Thus, 
although the customary relationship between lender and 
borrower is a relevant consideration (just as customary 
relationships between parents and subsidiaries have always 
been relevant to the determination of liability), there must 
also be a functional assessment of the amount of control 
exercised by the lender. 
 
III. Applying the Test 
 
Now that we have set forth the standard for liability, we 
must determine whether plaintiffs have put forth enough 
evidence that GECC and CompTech constituted a single 
employer under the WARN Act to survive GECC's motion for 
summary judgment. Therefore, we will analyze the 
plaintiffs' evidence by reference to the DOL factors. We note 
at the outset that our adoption of the DOL factors as the 
proper test for WARN Act liability compels a rejection of the 
plaintiffs' first contention, i.e., that solely by virtue of its 
ownership of CompTech stock options, GECC was a WARN 
Act employer. 
 
In deciding that the DOL factors are appr opriate for 
WARN Act veil-piercing, we also hold that the application of 
those factors is a "factual" question rather than a "legal" 
one. Although our own jurisprudence has been somewhat 
opaque as to whether the veil-piercing/alter ego tests 
present factual questions or legal ones, compare Craig v. 
Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 148-49 (3d 
Cir. 1988), with Carpenters Health & W elfare Fund v. 
Kenneth R. Ambrose, Inc., 727 F.2d 279, 283 (3d Cir. 1983), 
it is well established that the "integrated enterprise" test -- 
which is more akin to the DOL factors -- pr esents a factual 
question, see, e.g., Limbach Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l 
Ass'n, 949 F.2d 1241 (3d Cir. 1991). In light of our 
treatment of the integrated enterprise test, as well as the 
fact that most jurisdictions treat veil-pier cing inquiries as 
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factual, see Crane v. Green & Freedman Baking Co., 134 
F.3d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1998), we conclude that the WARN Act 
test for intercorporate liability presents a question of fact. 
Of course, as is always the case, our decision to 
characterize it as such does not preclude an inquiry as to 
whether plaintiffs have put forth enough evidence to create 
a genuine issue of material fact so as to survive summary 
judgment. 
 
A. Common Ownership 
 
After GECC purchased CompTech at a private foreclosure 
sale, it immediately transferred the shar es to Gaffney and 
Brooks. When Gaffney stepped down as CompTech's Chief 
Executive Officer, Gaffney and Br ooks transferred their 
shares back to Holdings, and the shares were reissued to 
Villa. Technically, then, GECC was not the owner of 
CompTech at the time of the unnoticed plant closure, but 
we must acknowledge that the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiffs, allows for the possibility 
that these transactions were not bona fide transfers of 
ownership. See, e.g., NLRB v. Big Bear Supermarkets # 3, 
640 F.2d 924, 930 (9th Cir 1980) (upholding afinding of 
single employer status in part due to the fact that the 
transfer of ownership to an insider for no consideration did 
not bear the hallmarks of a bona fide transaction). 
 
Gaffney was under contract to GECC at the time he 
received the shares; he paid no consideration for them, 
pledged them to GECC as security for CompTech's loans, 
and, in fact, was indemnified by GECC for any liability 
arising out of his status as shareholder . He relinquished 
the shares for only nominal consideration at GECC's 
request. When Villa received the shares, he paid only 
nominal consideration, pledged the shares and stock 
powers to GECC, and took them subject to GECC's 
extensive options. Finally, GECC's own restructuring memo 
(authored by GECC Vice-President Jeanette Chen) 
recommended both that CompTech be "held" until the 
"investment" could be recouped, and  that "ownership" be 
transferred to the management team, suggesting that 
GECC understood itself to be the true owner of the shares 
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despite the nominal vesting of title in Gaffney, Brooks, and 
Villa. 
 
We agree with the Ninth Circuit that a prerequisite for 
lender liability is that whatever responsibility the lender 
may have assumed for the borrower's business, such 
responsibility must have been for the "or dinary operation" 
of the business. Thus, as in bankruptcy law, the lender 
may not be liable under WARN for "winding up" or 
foreclosure activities not taken as part of an effort to 
operate the business in the "normal commer cial sense," 
Weslock, 66 F.3d at 245, even if, as a result of the 
foreclosure, the lender "owns" the shares for some period of 
time. Cf. In re United Healthcare System, Inc., 200 F.3d 170, 
179 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a fiduciary's "winding up" 
activities in the course of a company's liquidation pursuant 
to a bankruptcy filing cannot give rise to W ARN Act 
liability). However, GECC's own documents demonstrate 
that it was not involved with CompTech mer ely long enough 
to wind up the affairs of the company; rather , in its own 
words, it intended to "hold" CompT ech until its investment 
could be recouped and for CompTech to continue to 
conduct ordinary operations. For these r easons, we believe 
that, for summary judgment purposes, drawing all 
inferences in the plaintiffs' favor , the common ownership 
prong is satisfied. GECC cannot escape the inference that 
it "owned" CompTech simply by focusing attention on the 
formal "ownership" of Gaffney, V illa, and Brooks, or by 
characterizing its activities as those of a lender engaged in 
liquidation. 
 
B. Common Directors and/or Officers  
 
This factor, which may be analogized to the integrated 
enterprise test's "common management" factor , ordinarily 
looks to whether the two nominally separate corporations: 
(1) actually have the same people occupying officer or 
director positions with both companies; (2) r epeatedly 
transfer management-level personnel between the 
companies; or (3) have officers and directors of one 
company occupying some sort of formal management 
position with respect to the second company. See, e.g., 
Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1364 (10th Cir. 1993) 
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(finding no common management where the affiliated 
corporations shared no officers and only a single officer of 
the parent served in a managerial capacity with respect to 
subsidiaries); Local No. 627, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs 
v. NLRB, 518 F.2d 1040, 1047 (D.C. Cir . 1975) (finding the 
common management prong satisfied by several 
interchanges of higher-level managers and officers between 
the corporations), overruled on other gr ounds by Southern 
Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local 627, Int'l Union of Operating 
Eng'rs, 425 U.S. 800 (1976) (per curiam). In this case, there 
is no allegation that CompTech's top officers and directors 
-- Gaffney, Brooks, and Villa-- ever occupied any sort of 
director or officer position with GECC. Rather, the plaintiffs' 
theory is that these three men functioned as"agents" of 
GECC, and, because of that relationship, GECC's officers 
and directors were also officers and dir ectors of CompTech. 
 
Although we will discuss the application of agency 
principles to WARN Act liability in mor e detail below, for 
now we observe that the plaintiffs' interpr etation of this 
particular prong is misdirected. The W ARN Act test -- like 
the related integrated enterprise test -- is intended to 
discover whether the two nominally separate entities 
actually functioned as a single business, particularly with 
regard to labor policy. See NLRB v. Br owning-Ferris Indus. 
of Pa., Inc., 691 F.2d 1117, 1122 (3d Cir . 1982); Armbruster 
v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1338 (6th Cir . 1983) (a finding of 
single-employer status is justified when the corporations 
are "highly integrated with respect to ownership and 
operations" (citations omitted)). To that end, the "common 
officers and/or directors" prong of the test should look only 
to whether some of the same individuals comprise (or , at 
some point, did comprise) the formal management team of 
each company. See, e.g., Armbruster, 711 F.2d at 1339 (in 
the integrated enterprise context, describing as"sketchy" 
evidence of common management even where a single 
person had served as president of both companies, and 
where the subsidiary had formally r eleased decisionmaking 
power to the parent). 
 
The plaintiffs' theory, by contrast, is mor e appropriately 
employed to satisfy other prongs of the test, such as the "de 
facto exercise of control" factor , the factor relating to 
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personnel policy, or the factor relating to dependency of 
operations. See, e.g., Frank, 3 F .3d at 1362-63 (evaluating 
an allegation that the officers of the subsidiary were 
controlled by the officers of the par ent in the context of the 
interrelation of operations prong of the integrated enterprise 
test). This is particularly true in light of the fact that the 
DOL factors, rather than using the phrase "common 
management" as is utilized by the integrated enterprise 
test, instead specifically require the presence of common 
directors or officers, a for mulation that is facially more 
narrow. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated the existence of 
any persons who, either simultaneously or in consecutive 
periods, held a directorate or an officer position both with 
CompTech and with GECC, and the "agency" theory with 
respect to Gaffney and Villa -- which we discuss in more 
detail below -- would not satisfy this requir ement even if 
we were to accept its truth. Thus, we conclude that the 
plaintiffs have not created an issue of fact with respect to 
the presence of common directors or officers, and this 
factor must be weighed in favor of the defendant. 
 
C. Unity of Personnel Policies Emanating 
       from a Common Source 
 
We begin by interpreting the language of this prong to 
require the factfinder to focus the inquiry less on the 
hierarchical relationship between the companies (as such 
relationships may be considered in other aspects of the 
test) than on whether the companies actually functioned as 
a single entity with regard to its r elationships with 
employees. 
 
That GECC and CompTech did not share labor policies, 
or even coordinate their labor policies, is essentially 
undisputed.8 Affidavits fr om CompTech and GECC 
employees demonstrate that CompTech had its own 
personnel managers who never received any dir ection from 
GECC regarding their duties, and no evidence has been 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. We believe that a "coordinated" labor policy would be as relevant as a 
"unified" policy; for instance, in double-br easted operations, there is 
obviously no "unity" of policy -- and yet this is precisely the type of 
situation that the test is meant to capture. 
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offered to contradict these statements. But even were we to 
accept the plaintiffs' theory that Villa, as GECC's agent, at 
some level instituted all of CompTech's policies, including 
labor policies, on GECC's behalf, such evidence is not 
sufficient to satisfy this prong of the test in the absence of 
indications that GECC had a particular inter est in how 
CompTech's labor policies were designed, or issued specific 
directives to Villa on the subject. The evidence that 
plaintiffs have offered to demonstrate that GECC had an 
interest in controlling the personnel policies at CompTech 
is scant, and largely amounts to establishing that 
CompTech, pursuant to the terms of the loan agreement 
(and on a very few occasions) sought GECC appr oval for 
decisions to institute bonus programs and to pay salaries 
in excess of $100,000. Such limited monitoring of 
compensation expenditures as part of a general loan 
agreement requiring oversight of CompT ech's spending in a 
number of areas is not sufficient to demonstrate a "unity of 
personnel policies emanating from a common source." 
 
There are some inconsistencies in the evidence submitted 
by GECC. GECC submitted the affidavit of Jeanette Chen, 
who swore that GECC had never attempted to control the 
hiring or firing of CompTech employees, and that the loan 
restriction preventing CompTech fr om paying salaries in 
excess of $100,000 was intended to ensure that CompTech 
maintained a frugal budget. But both of these statements 
were contradicted by other pieces of evidence in this 
litigation. Gaffney's letter to GECC specifically states that 
he resigned his post as CEO of CompTech at GECC's 
request, and other deposition evidence indicates that he 
was asked to resign due to GECC's dissatisfaction with his 
strategies for CompTech. Moreover , internal GECC 
memoranda characterize the salary restriction as part of an 
effort to ensure that GECC could monitor the hiring of 
"key" personnel. Finally, the existence of the"Villa Call" and 
the references to Benton as a "back up president" seem to 
show that GECC, if nothing else, conceived itself as having 
control over the hiring and firing of CompT ech's president. 
 
Despite these inconsistencies, we do not believe that 
plaintiffs have created a genuine issue of material fact as to 
the existence of a "unity" of policy. Even if we were to 
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disregard Chen's affidavit entir ely and focus solely on the 
other evidence, the fact that GECC may have contr olled the 
hiring and firing of the company's president and chief 
executive officer, and monitored the hiring of a few other 
high-level managers (there is no evidence that GECC ever 
suggested that a particular person other than Benton be 
hired, or prevented a candidate fr om being hired), simply is 
not enough to find a "unity" of personnel"policy." 
 
The plaintiffs alternatively urge us to weigh this factor in 
their favor on the ground that the analogous"centralized 
control of labor" prong from the integrated enterprise test 
permits an inquiry into whether the par ent corporation, 
though perhaps not involved in day-to-day employment 
policies, mandated the employment practice at issue. 
Plaintiffs allege that GECC made the decision to close the 
plant, and because the plant closing is the r elevant practice 
giving rise to the litigation, submit that that decision is 
enough to tip the balance. However, as explained above, we 
believe that, for WARN Act purposes, allegations of this 
kind of "direct" control are more appropriately considered 
as part of the "de facto exercise of contr ol" factor, discussed 
infra. We conclude that the plaintif fs have not created a 
genuine issue of fact as to the existence of a unified 
personnel policy, and we will weigh this factor in the 
defendant's favor. 
 
D. Dependency of Operations 
 
We consider the "dependency of operations" factor to be 
virtually identical to the integrated enterprise test's 
"interrelation of operations" factor , and will consider it in 
that light. When examining the "interrelation of operations" 
factor, courts generally consider the existence of 
arrangements such as the sharing of administrative or 
purchasing services, see, e.g., Penntech Papers, Inc. v. 
NLRB, 706 F.2d 18, 25 (1st Cir. 1983), interchanges of 
employees or equipment, see Hukill v. Auto Car e, Inc., 192 
F.3d 437, 443 (4th Cir. 1999), and commingled finances, 
see UA Local 343 of the United Ass'n of Jour neymen & 
Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Indus. of the U.S. 
& Can. v. Nor-Cal Plumbing, Inc., 48 F .3d 1465, 1472 (9th 
Cir. 1995). No evidence of this sort was pr esented by the 
 
                                40 
  
plaintiffs. Instead, plaintiffs r eiterate their theory that Villa, 
and Gaffney before him, were stooges, or at least agents, of 
GECC, and that therefore all of their actions may be 
attributed to GECC. Because certainly Villa and Gaffney 
were routinely involved with the day-to-day operation of the 
business, the plaintiffs maintain GECC was in the position 
of general manager of the company. 
 
We decide whether to apply agency principles to establish 
liability under a federal statute in accordance with the 
degree to which such principles effectuate the policies of 
the statute. See AT&T v. Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 
42 F.3d 1421, 1429-33 (3d Cir. 1994). This is not dissimilar 
from the rules of common law, where ther e are different 
types of agency relationships, and the degr ee to which the 
actions of the agent are attributed to the principal vary for 
each. See id. at 1434-35. Thus, if we ar e to import any 
agency principles to the test for WARN Act intercorporate 
liability, we must do so selectively, with an eye to 
effectuating WARN Act purposes. 
 
Plaintiffs argue that the "agency" relationships alleged to 
exist between GECC and Gaffney, and later between GECC 
and Villa, establish that GECC had contr ol over the day-to- 
day operations of CompTech. Control over day-to-day 
operations has been held to be indicative of interr elation of 
operations. See, e.g., Lusk v. Foxmeyer Health Corp., 129 
F.3d 773, 778 (5th Cir. 1997); Cook v. Arrowsmith 
Shelburne, Inc., 69 F.3d 1235, 1241 (2d Cir. 1995). 
However, the mere fact that the subsidiary's chain-of- 
command ultimately results in the top officers of the 
subsidiary reporting to the parent corporation does not 
establish the kind of day-to-day control necessary to 
establish an interrelation of operations. See Frank v. U.S. 
West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1362-63 (10th Cir. 1993); Martin v. 
Safeguard Scientifics, Inc., 17 F . Supp. 2d 357, 364 (E.D. 
Pa. 1998) ("[I]t is never sufficient to establish only that a 
chain of command eventually ends at the parent's 
headquarters."). 
 
Moreover, dependency of operations cannot be 
established by the parent corporation's exer cise of its 
ordinary powers of ownership, i.e., to vote in directors and 
set general policies. See Lusk, 129 F .3d at 778. Therefore, 
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if "agency principles" are to be used to weigh the 
"dependency of operations" factor in plaintif fs' favor, the 
policies behind WARN Act liability -- and limited liability for 
corporations generally -- require that the plaintiffs 
establish that the scope of the agency relationship was 
such that GECC had the right to direct and control the 
manner in which Gaffney and Villa undertook their duties. 
In other words, for such an all-encompassing factor such 
as "dependency of operations" -- a factor which, by its 
nature, looks to the daily functioning of the two companies 
-- the plaintiffs must establish the existence of what was 
known at common law as a "master-servant" agency 
relationship. See AT&T, 42 F .3d at 1435. 
 
Plaintiffs' evidence on this point consists of: (1) letters 
and similar contacts from both Gaffney and Villa to GECC 
requesting permission to take certain kinds of actions that 
the loan documents would otherwise forbid; (2) the terms of 
the consulting agreement between Gaffney and GECC and 
the circumstances surrounding his employment; (3) the 
circumstances surrounding the firing of Gaffney and his 
replacement with Villa; and (4) the fact that consultant 
Stuart Benton was brought in at GECC's r equest, and 
apparently worked closely with Villa. 
 
We do not believe that this evidence is sufficient to create 
an issue of fact with regard to an agency relationship that 
would support a finding of dependency of operations. At 
most, the evidence establishes that Gaffney was something 
of an independent contractor, hired, according to the terms 
of his contract, to "exercise general executive authority over 
all business operations of the companies subject at all 
times to the control of the board of dir ectors." In other 
words, Gaffney was to run the company as he saw fit, and 
not in accordance with GECC directives. Under such 
circumstances, Gaffney's actions ar e not attributable to 
GECC merely by virtue of the existence of his consulting 
agreement. 
 
Further, because Villa was president and CEO of 
CompTech at the time of the closing, as well as at the time 
that plaintiffs argue that WARN Act notice should have 
issued, it is his relationship with GECC that is more 
relevant -- and Villa's relationship was even more tenuous 
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than Gaffney's. Villa was not under contract to GECC, and, 
in fact, Chen attested (and the plaintiffs have not disputed) 
that she was unaware that Gaffney had even replaced 
Brooks with Villa until the chief financial officer mentioned 
it to her in the course of conversation. Though GECC did 
apparently view itself as having the power to r emove Villa 
(hence the Villa Call), as we have stated, such general 
powers of ownership are not a sufficient basis for a finding 
of liability. Further, the right to hir e or fire does not, in 
itself, distinguish a "master-servant" agency relationship 
from any other sort of agency relationship. In fact, the most 
plaintiffs are able to muster with r egard to an agency 
relationship between Villa and GECC is the letter Villa 
wrote asking GECC to "make decisions now" concerning the 
requests he had outlined. These requests, however, were for 
additional financing and (the letter is not entir ely clear) 
perhaps permission for a large-scale merger. These are not 
the kind of mine-run matters that would support afinding 
that Villa was behaving as GECC's agent in his 
management of CompTech. 
 
The situation in Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Financial 
Corp., 828 F.2d 686 (11th Cir. 1987), presents a useful 
contrast. In that case, a corporation defaulted on its loans 
and the major creditor exercised its rights to elect a new 
slate of directors. The new directors allegedly mismanaged 
the company, and the borrower brought suit against the 
lender on the theory that the directors had acted as the 
"agents" of the lender. See id. at 691. The court concluded 
that the borrower had created a genuine issue of material 
fact as to the existence of an agency relationship, basing its 
decision in part on the deposition testimony of one of the 
directors, in which he stated that he both worked for the 
lender, and that he worked closely with the lender on all 
major matters of policy. See id. at 692. Such evidence 
stands in stark contrast to the situation befor e us, in which 
the man alleged to be GECC's agent submitted an affidavit, 
as well as deposition testimony, denying that GECC ever 
controlled his actions, and the plaintif fs have produced no 
specific instances of GECC control to r ebut his testimony. 
 
As for Villa's and Gaffney's requests for GECC approval of 
actions involving large-scale expenditur es, restructuring, or 
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the disposition of equipment in which GECC r etained a 
security interest, these cannot form the basis of a 
demonstration of "dependency of operations," as there is no 
evidence that GECC ever did anything more than approve 
or disapprove such requests, and no evidence that it was 
involved in the details or manner of implementation of any 
CompTech business plans. GECC was exer cising one of the 
defining rights of a secured lender: the right to prevent the 
transfer of its collateral. That GECC may also, at this point, 
have been a "parent" of CompTech does not prevent it from 
exercising such pedestrian creditor's rights without 
incurring liability, any more than parental status prevents 
a company from controlling its subsidiary's boards of 
directors without incurring liability. Cf. Japan Petroleum Co. 
(Nigeria) Ltd. v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 456 F . Supp. 831, 846 (D. 
Del. 1978) (refusing to pierce the corporate veil in part 
because the "control" alleged by the plaintiffs was 
attributable to the fact that the parent corporation was a 
major creditor of its subsidiary). We do not intend to create 
a jurisprudence that discourages loans in general or 
rescues of troubled business enterprises in particular. 
Further, the fact that in an attempt to keep itself 
operational, CompTech independently sought additional 
financing from an outside lender to r eplace GECC cuts 
against a conclusion that CompTech was closely integrated 
with GECC itself. 
 
If GECC's "loans" to CompTech had not been made at 
arm's length (either because of a failur e to require interest 
payments, a lack of formal documentation, etc), such 
evidence would cut in favor of finding a dependency of 
operations. See, e.g., Vance v. NLRB, 71 F.3d 486, 493 (4th 
Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (finding an interr elation of 
operations in part because of numerous inter est-free, or 
unrepaid, "loans" between corporations). But there is 
nothing to suggest that GECC's loans to CompT ech were 
anything other than bona fide arm's length transactions. As 
for the plaintiffs' final allegation, that Benton served as 
something of a roaming GECC "enforcer ," once again, 
plaintiffs have failed to submit any support for their claims. 
Villa, Benton, and other top-level CompT ech managers all 
attested that Benton did nothing more than observe and 
occasionally make suggestions, only some of which were 
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followed. No evidence has been offered to suggest that 
GECC was using Benton functionally to manage 
CompTech's day-to-day activities. 
 
Finally, we address the question whether ther e can be 
said to have been "dependency" of operations due to the 
fact that CompTech was financially dependent on GECC's 
loans, and ultimately was unable to stay afloat without 
them. As we remarked earlier, the loans were made in the 
ordinary course of business, and there is no evidence that 
they included especially favorable terms or bore other 
indicia of a lack of legitimacy. Under such cir cumstances, 
loans -- even from a parent to a subsidiary -- cannot be 
sufficient to satisfy this prong, particularly in this context 
where there is no serious dispute that GECC, rather than 
attempting to establish a continuing relationship whereby 
CompTech would be permanently dependent on GECC for 
financing, was instead by this point conducting a"rescue" 
operation in an attempt to "return Company to 
profitability," We surely do not want to discourage 
companies from attempting to keep their subsidiary 
operations afloat with temporary loans by holding that the 
mere fact that loans were even necessary establishes a 
"dependency of operations" giving rise to liability. Cf. United 
Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am. v. 163 Pleasant St., 
960 F.2d 1080, 1094 (1st Cir. 1992) (r efusing to find 
"inadequate capitalization" in alter ego inquiry where parent 
repeatedly infused subsidiary with cash in an ultimately 
unsuccessful attempt to resurrect a failing company). 
 
The same logic holds true for GECC's enforcement of the 
prepayment provisions of its loans upon CompTech's sale of 
R&R Plastics. Regardless of whether GECC was 
CompTech's parent as a result of its options or its stock 
ownership, it also was indisputably a lender as a r esult of 
the revolving lines of credit and the r epeated cash 
advances. As such, an attempt to seek repayment of its 
loans cannot be realistically characterized as a "siphoning" 
of funds or as part of a deliberate attempt to keep 
CompTech undercapitalized. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that the plaintif fs have failed to 
create a genuine issue of material fact with r espect to 
CompTech's "dependency" on GECC. As we have explained, 
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there is no evidence that GECC's loans wer e intended as a 
method of keeping CompTech deliberately under capitalized, 
and if dependency of operations is to be proved solely by 
the existence of an alleged "agency" r elationship between 
the lender/parent corporation and the officers of the 
borrower/subsidiary, plaintiffs must submit evidence of far 
more oversight and control on the part of the principal than 
has been done in this case. 
 
E. De Facto Exercise of Control  
 
As we have explained, the "de facto exercise of control" 
factor is not intended to support liability based on a 
parent's exercise of control pursuant to the ordinary 
incidents of stock ownership. Nor may this factor be used 
to create liability for a lender's general oversight of its 
collateral. The factor is appropriately utilized, however, if 
the parent or lender was the decisionmaker r esponsible for 
the employment practice giving rise to the litigation. 
Further, because the balancing of the factors is not a 
mechanical exercise, if the de facto exer cise of control was 
particularly striking -- for instance, wer e it effectuated by 
"disregard[ing] the separate legal personality of its 
subsidiary," Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F .2d 739, 757 (7th 
Cir. 1989) -- then liability might be warranted even in the 
absence of the other factors. 
 
In support of its allegations of "de facto" control by 
GECC, the plaintiffs continue to point to GECC's general 
monitoring of CompTech; the fact that GECC's approval 
was required under the loan agreements for a number of 
projects involving CompTech's finances, budgeting, and 
GECC's collateral; the relationship among GECC, Villa, and 
Gaffney; and the fact that CompTech ultimately closed as a 
result of GECC's decision to call the loans. See Part I, 
supra. Although, for the reasons discussed above, we do 
not find GECC's monitoring of CompTech'sfinances or its 
relationship with Villa and Gaffney particularly probative, 
we are given pause by the extent of GECC's involvement in 
the decision to close the plant. 
 
CompTech was kept operational for three years solely as 
a result of GECC's own decision to hold on to CompTech 
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and ensure the company's return to profitability. During 
this time, CompTech was almost always behind in its 
payments to GECC, and was only able to survive by 
GECC's extension of due dates and additional financing. 
Therefore, for three years, GECC was aware that its funding 
was the only thing keeping a troubled company afloat. It 
continued to invest, but when it finally concluded that 
CompTech could not be saved, it immediately made the 
decision, according to its internal documents, not to 
"refus[e] to loan additional working capital," Adams v. 
Erwin Weller Co., 87 F.3d 269, 273 (8th Cir. 1996), but 
instead to "liquidate the company" -- thus forcing 
CompTech to close its doors two weeks later . The decision 
is thus arguably less like a subsidiary's independent choice 
to terminate its business in the face of sever e cash 
constraints than like the decision of a WARN Act employer 
to close a single site of its operations.9  
 
On the other hand, the evidence also demonstrates that 
even before GECC decided to withdraw its support, 
CompTech was contemplating closure and seeking legal 
advice as to its labor obligations. CompTech's repeated 
requests for financing, coupled with its war nings to GECC 
that it would be forced to shut down without further cash 
infusions, demonstrate that CompTech was acting as an 
independent entity seeking further capital rather than as a 
branch of GECC operating under GECC's direction. In the 
absence of other indicia of a unified status between GECC 
and CompTech, we cannot conclude that the evidence 
supports an inference that GECC's decision to accept 
CompTech assets as collateral on the loans manifested a 
"de facto exercise of control" equivalent to an employer's 
decision to close a work site. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Such a conclusion is strengthened by the fact that, although in many 
disputes arising under labor legislation, the acts giving rise to 
liability 
are likely to be ones that are contr olled at the "local" level (for 
instance, 
acts of discriminatory hiring), the very natur e of the acts that give 
rise 
to WARN Act liability (a plant closure) are likely to result from 
decisions 
made from the highest levels within the corporate structure, rendering 
an examination of a parent corporation's r ole in the decision more 
important. 
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To be sure, the distinction between a decision to call a 
loan and a decision to shut down a company is afine one, 
and the fact that GECC in some sense "owned" CompTech 
at the time of closure renders the distinction finer still. But 
the business of judging is, in considerable measur e, one of 
line-drawing. While the demarcation her e is not clear, 
indeed is quite close, we think it falls on GECC's side of the 
line. We acknowledge that large lenders-- whether or not 
they are also parents -- cannot help but be aware of the 
consequences of their decisions to foreclose and dispose of 
collateral; in other areas of the law, a party is "presumed to 
intend all the natural and probable consequences flowing 
from his deliberate acts." United States v. Applewhite, 195 
F.3d 679, 690 (3d Cir. 1999) (quotations omitted). However, 
we must be scrupulous in our efforts to distinguish 
between situations in which a parent/lender has ultimately 
assumed responsibility for the continuing viability of a 
company (thus incurring liability for WARN Act violations) 
and situations in which the borrower has r etained the 
ultimate responsibility for keeping the company active. 
 
Here, CompTech's independent resear ch into its legal 
obligations, its negotiations with GECC, and its attempts to 
secure additional financing all reflect CompTech's own 
vitality, and demonstrate that GECC's decision to cut off its 
funding was not a "de facto exercise of control" over 
CompTech's decision to close its doors. After consideration 
of all of the evidence, we conclude that the plaintiffs have 
not created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether 
GECC exercised "de facto" control over CompTech 
generally, or by virtue of its calling of the loan, and thus 
this factor weighs in favor of the defendant.10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Plaintiffs argue that the doctrine of issue preclusion bars GECC from 
denying that it exercised control over CompTech ever since the 1991 
foreclosure. At that time, GECC moved in the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois to enjoin the former CompTech directors 
from filing for bankruptcy. In granting the motion, the court concluded 
that under the loan agreements, GECC had the right to elect a new 
board of directors upon a default, that GECC could only hope to recoup 
its investment in CompTech if the business continued as a going 
concern, and that if the former dir ectors were to file for bankruptcy, 
GECC would be irreparably harmed. See General Elec. Capital Corp. v. 
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F. Summary 
 
The DOL factors, like the integrated enterprise test, 
require that two corporations be "highly integrated with 
respect to ownership and operations" befor e they will be 
considered a single employer for WARN Act purposes. 
Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1338 (6th Cir. 1983) 
(quotations omitted). The evidence prof fered by the 
plaintiffs simply does not establish the high degree of 
integration required by the analysis set forth in this 
opinion. Though GECC may have monitored much of the 
activity at CompTech, there is no question that at all times 
CompTech remained an entirely separate business entity 
that did not rely on GECC to supply it with personnel, 
equipment, facilities, clients, administrative services, or any 
of the other various resources typically"shared" between 
companies that are ultimately found liable for each others' 
debts. And, as we have discussed, there is a dearth of 
evidence to support the plaintiffs' theory that GECC 
effected a pervasive control over all of CompTech's 
functioning by virtue of its relationship with CompTech's 
CEOs. 
 
Although the plaintiffs have created a genuine issue of 
fact with respect to GECC's ownership of CompT ech, they 
have failed to meet their burden with r espect to the other 
facets of the DOL test. The existence of an "agency" 
relationship between GECC and CompTech's CEOs would 
not establish the existence of "common dir ectors and/or 
officers," and, without evidence establishing not only that 
an agency relationship existed, but also the scope of that 
relationship, the plaintiffs cannot r ely on the "agency" 
theory to establish "dependency of operations." Additionally, 
under the circumstances presented her e, GECC's decision 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Chicago Plastics Prods. Ltd. P'ship, No. 91C4291 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 
1991). 
As the District Court in this action properly concluded, the Illinois 
court 
did not purport to hold that GECC exercised"control" over CompTech at 
all, much less the nature and degree of control relevant to an 
assessment of WARN Act liability. See Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 
80 F. Supp. 2d 510, 526 (W.D. Pa. 1999). Thus, issue preclusion is 
inapplicable. See Temple Univ. v. White , 941 F.2d 201, 212 (3d Cir. 
1991). 
 
                                49 
  
to call its loan does not give rise to an infer ence of "de facto 
exercise of control." Finally, the plaintiffs have not put forth 
any additional facts not included in the DOL factors that 
bear on the question of GECC's liability. Ther efore, the 
District Court's grant of summary judgment to GECC will 
be affirmed.11 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. In their final attempt to evade summary judgment, plaintiffs argue 
that the District Court erred in excluding (without first conducting an in 
limine hearing) the expert affidavit of Thomas Myers. Myers, a qualified 
authority on banking practices and bank fraud, attested that in his 
opinion, GECC "substantively operated" CompT ech after the foreclosure, 
and that the controls it exercised over CompTech "were not primarily 
limited to the financial controls nor mally exercised in a typical 
debtor/creditor relationship." The District Court concluded on the basis 
of the transcript of an eight-hour deposition that Myers's lack of 
familiarity with CompTech corporate structur e, coupled with his lack of 
familiarity with aspects of the loan agreement between GECC and 
CompTech, rendered his opinion lacking in a sufficient factual basis to 
be relevant to the plaintiffs' case. See Pearson, 80 F. Supp. 2d at 529. 
We review a district court's decision to conduct a hearing regarding the 
reliability of expert evidence, as well as its decision to admit or 
exclude 
such evidence, for abuse of discretion. See Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 
F.3d 136, 154 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
As we have discussed above, WARN Act liability does not turn on 
whether a party is a "parent" or a "lender," or whether a "lender" 
behaved in typical fashion. Indeed, we have alr eady acknowledged that 
GECC may well have been a parent of CompT ech. Thus, because we 
have declined to create separate standar ds of liability for lenders and 
parents, regardless of whether the District Court was correct in 
concluding that Myers's affidavit was lacking in a factual basis, his 
opinion was ultimately not germane and no hearing was necessary. Cf. 
Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding 
that in limine hearings are encouraged when courts are concerned with 
the factual, rather than legal, dimensions of the evidence). We therefore 
affirm the District Court's decision to exclude the affidavit. 
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